Stephen Pope, Human Evolution and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007), xiii + 359 pgs.
- McKenzie Alexander, The Structural Evolution of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007), ix + 300 pgs.
What is morality? Is it an emotion, an evolved adaptive strategy, a mimetic illusion, sex, friendship, a neural state of the brain, an emergent property, or a virtuous character trait—or even some combination of these? Is morality something that can be taught? Is it merely biological? Are there universal aspects of it that apply across cultures? Is it possible only in humans? How are we to understand the basic Christian claim, found in the scriptures, that ‘God is love’ (and thereby ‘moral’)? Many contributors to this debate believe that morality shares two common elements: 1) a cognitive apprehension of the good, and 2) an affective affirmation of the good.
Since Thomas Aquinas, theologians have claimed that the very fact that humans have a moral conscience can be taken as evidence for the existence of God. Michael Ruse (‘Evolutionary Theory and Christian Ethics: Are They In Harmony,’ Zygon vol. 29, no. 1 (1994):5-24), however, asks if modern evolutionary theory poses a problem for the Christian’s thinking about morality. He contends that it certainly poses ‘threats’ for those who would argue that certain practices are wrong because they are perceived to be unnatural. Moreover, he asserts that at a deep level, despite superficial similarities between its conclusions and the commandment of love, Neo-Darwinism points to an essential relativism about morality, thereby striking at the very core of all Christian thought on moral behavior. Thus, Ruse concludes that those who are worried about the clash between science and religion have good reasons for their worries.
But is this issue that cut and dry? Stephen Pope (Professor of Theological Ethics at Boston College) does not think that it is. In fact, explaining morality, cooperation and altruism remains three of the greatest challenges for evolutionary biology. Throughout the world today, scientists increasingly recognize that many moral and altruistic activities observed among animals cannot be explained solely by the theories of kin selection and of reciprocal benefit. Some Philosophers, for example, contend that altruism, a behavior which is costly to the actor and beneficial to the recipient, cannot, seemingly, be accounted for thoroughly by Neo-Darwinian processes (reference Jeffrey Schloss). Pope, arguing from a biologically-based view of evolution, stipulates that theologians need to engage with evolutionary theory rather than acting as if religion applies to one way of knowing and science to another (i.e. Barbour’s Independent domains classification of the relation between the two). He shows that our growing knowledge of human evolution is compatible with Christian ethics and morality, if evolution is not asserted in entirely reductionistic terms (i.e. methodological, epistemological, and ontological), while Christianity is not asserted within a fundamentalist framework. Pope contends that Christian ethics needs to include evolutionary extrapolations of human nature, as they provide necessary data regarding the conditions of human emergence, in both social and individual contexts. Pope concludes with a strong affirmation of human dignity alongside an appreciation for various theological virtues. He views this conclusion as consistent with a revised account of natural law and the cardinal virtues.
However, McKenzie Alexander (Reader in Philosophy at the London School of Economics and Political Science) thinks that the Neo-Darwinian paradigm can account for the evolution of morality, and by extension of altruism and cooperation. In his book, Alexander, arguing from a culturally-based view of evolution, stipulates that cooperation, a behavior which provides a benefit to another entity (recipient), and which is selected for because of its beneficial effect on the recipient, can be solely accounted for by evolution. Alexander’s book argues for the claim that much of the behavior we view as ‘moral’ exists because acting ‘morally’ benefits each of us to the greatest extent possible within the socially structured nature of the world. In drawing upon aspects of evolutionary game theory, and the theory of bounded rationality, Alexander gives a plausible scenario of how moral behavior can first emerge in social environments, as well as how it can perpetuate, even when it may not be ‘rational’ for it to persist. Alexander provides a putative theory of how moral principles and the moral sentiments play an indispensable role in effective choice, acting as fast and frugal methods to solve problems in social contexts. In so arguing, Alexander notes that whereas each individual within a social context has goals to attain, the ability of each individual to attain those goals is constrained by the fact of society. So then, the very structure of society confines how people interact, how people learn, and what people do in order to attain their goals.
All in all, both of these books are to be recommended for those who have interests in evolutionary accounts of morality, altruism, and cooperation (and thereby Christian ethics), as well as evolutionary game theory, philosophy of science, and social philosophy. I would caution the potential reader in saying, however, that both texts are mentally demanding, and as such one needs to be alert and oriented times four, to use medical and neurological jargon. As such, I deem the audience of these books to be graduate and postgraduate students.
Bradford McCall
Regent University