Michael R. Slater, Pragmatism and the Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), x + 207 Pps., $99.00.
In this book, Michael Slater provides a novel account of pragmatist views in the philosophy of religion. Pragmatism, as Richard Rorty once observed, is a vague, ambiguous, and even overworked word. Indeed, the word stands for no particular results, but is armed and militant against rationalism as a pretension and method, as William James asserted. As James attests, the word pragmatism does not so much refer to a particular view as it does to a family of views, a family that can differ remarkably in their aims and assumptions. Surprisingly little work has been conducted in what might be called “pragmatist philosophy of religion.” Slater seeks to correct this omission.
It is generally thought that pragmatism is at least ambivalent, and more frequently antagonistic toward religion, but Slater shows in this volume that this is not necessarily the case. Slater focuses his study on two fundamentally different stances toward religion taken by pragmatists: one, an atheistic stance that weds naturalism to pragmatism, and the second being a religious stance that is anti-naturalistic. Representative of the first, naturalistic view, are John Dewey, Richard Rorty, and Philip Kitcher. Representing the anti-naturalistic view are William James and Charles Sanders Peirce. Naturalism, as Slater uses the term, refers more accurately to what may be referred to as ontological naturalism. Of these two positions toward naturalism in the pragmatist tradition, the naturalistic stance has unquestionably been the most significant, historically speaking, at least since the 1920s at the height of Dewey’s influence. But Slater argues herein that the anti-naturalist stance of pragmatism is a viable option in today’s intellectual environment.
The first five chapters are mostly historical and interpretative, whereas the last two are constructive. On account of his stature in philosophy of religion and psychology of religion, this text devotes two chapters to James’s views on religion, whereas it only focuses one on Peirce’s. Indeed, chapters 1 and 2 examine aspects of James’s religious thought that are of particular relevance for contemporary work in philosophy of religion and the scientific study of religion. The first chapter focuses on James’s theory of religion and methodological approach to the study of religion in his The Varieties of Religious Experience. It aims to clarify some of the misconceptions of James’s views on religion, which rejects what Slater calls an essentialist and sui generis view of religion, and also points out James’s anti-reductionistic position, and his attention to the psychologically complex nature of religious belief. Chapter 2 turns our attention to James’s rejection of the then-contemporary forms of natural theology that were rationalist and intellectualist, but argues that whereas he was critical of it during his life, he may not be critical of modern manifestations of natural theology, as the modern forms seek to provide rational support for belief, not proof per se.
Chapter 3 explores Peirce’s contribution to natural theology by focusing upon his “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” (1908). In addition to offering a critical assessment and interpretation of his argument therein, this third chapter also shows how it relates to a number of contemporary views in the philosophy of religion that support the teleological argument for the existence of God. The fourth chapter critically examines Dewey’s account in A Common Faith, which highlights a combination of naturalism, secularlism, and accommodationism. It raises some objections to some of its specific claims and assumptions. Additionally, it argues that Dewey’s account of religion fails for two reasons: it fails to show that theism are not rationally justified, and it fails to in its aim to convince traditional religious advocates to reject their supernatural religious beliefs, practices, and institutions. Chapter 5 looks beyond the classical pragmatists toward contemporary adherents, particularly Rorty and Kitcher. These two scholars continue to defend Dewey’s position on religion, while also modifying it along a couple of lines. It demonstrates that some of the problems that were pointed out with reference to Dewey’s account of religion also apply to them.
Chapters 6 and 7 are constructive in their argumentation. Taken together, these last two chapters attempt to demonstrate not only that pragmatism can support traditional forms of religion but also that a pluralistic and anti-naturalistic version of pragmatism has several distinctive features that many theologians might find attractive. In attempting to do this, chapter 6 explores how both pragmatism and theism can support a commitment to a weak version of metaphysical realism. It further has some important implications on a number of issues in the philosophy of religion, such as the compatibility of pragmatism and traditional forms of theism, which entail the mind-independent reality of God. Chapter 7 sketches the outlines of a contemporary pragmatist defense of the legitimacy of supernaturalistic faith and practices. Building on the first five chapters, this final one discusses the evidentialist challenges to religious belief and the status of theistic arguments. It contends that pragmatist views on each of these issues are friendly toward traditional forms of religious faith.
In sum, Slater has a tall order in attempting to delineate a pragmatist philosophy of religion. But he effectively addresses this lacuna of scholarship with this text. Indeed, he shows that there is no necessary connection between the advocation of a pragmatist viewpoint and naturalism, nor is pragmatism necessarily unfriendly toward traditional forms of religious commitment. This book will be of particular interest to American philosophers of religion and theologians.
Bradford McCall
Holy Apostles College and Seminary