- Mantzavinos, Naturalistic Hermeneutics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), xv +180 Pps.,
Unfortunately, it has come to be viewed that the method of the natural sciences cannot generate apprehension of meaning. Professor C. Mantzavinos (who holds the Chair in Economics and Philosophy at the Witten/Herdecke University, Germany), attempts to demonstrate that, on the contrary, meaningful human actions can be dealt with scientifically, using the prevalent hypothetico-deductive that is used in the natural sciences. Within this text, Mantzavinos defends the thesis that there is no fundamental methodological distinction between the natural sciences and the social sciences.
In defending his thesis, Mantzavinos both critiques and constructs. In part one of this text, he critiques what he refers to as the hermeneutical dead ends of Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer, who collectively advocate what has become known as philosophical hermeneutics. He contends that Dilthey’s attempt to show that the human sciences comprise an independent (autonomous, i.e.) whole alongside the natural sciences is a failure. Moreover, Mantzavinos critiques Heidegger’s conception of the hermeneutic circle, and sets forth a strong case that the hermeneutic circle is neither an ontological problem, nor a logical problem, and thus the existence of said ‘circle’ does not lead to a paralysis of thought. Third, Mantzavinos attempts to belie Gadamer’s assertion as to the universality of hermeneutics. In the concluding statements of his critique of philosophical hermeneutics, Mantzavinos asserts that philosophical hermeneutics leads to a philosophical dead end.
In part two, Mantzavinos highlights a naturalistic way of coping with the problematic of meaning. In chapter four, he explains three types of nexuses of meaning, including 1) as existential, 2) as a type of knowledge, and 3) as a method). He then sketches out the naturalistic way of dealing with the problematic of meaning, and thereafter pleads for a unified approach to the nexuses. He characterizes his method as naturalistic because it was first employed in the natural sciences, and only later employed in other disciplines. He posits three theses that are characteristic of the general methodological naturalism that should be used in merging epistemology and empirical science: 1) it is not the task of philosophy to provide a foundation to the sciences, 2) Philosophy does not have a more epistemologically privileged position than the sciences, and 3) The application of scientific theses, research, and results are both acceptable and imperative for philosophy (82).
In chapters five and six, respectively, Mantzavinos attempts to show that both human action in general and the results of such action, above all texts, can be easily grasped with a unified method. Pointedly, in chapter five, he explicates what it means for an action to have meaning. He posits that human behavior is meaningful when the actor engaging in this behavior interprets it against the background of his/her goals and beliefs while interacting with the surrounding environment. He contends that the hypothetico-deductive method can apprehend the meaning of action in two distinct ways: by transforming nexuses of meaning that repeatedly occur in connection with certain actions into causal nexuses, and by reconstructing the nexus of meaning of a specific action so that it is accurately depicted (88). In chapter six, Mantzavinos shows that the hypothetico-deductive method can apprehend the meaning of a linguistic expression in two ways: by transforming nexuses of meaning that repeatedly occur in connection with certain written expressions into causal nexuses, and by accurately determining the nexus of meaning that is connected with a specific text (125).
In sum, Mantzavinos argues a compelling – and controversial – case that the philosophical hermeneutics that is still predominant in Western society is afflicted with many deficiencies and contains little of use (155). He does not think either Heidegger or Gadamer offer satisfactory solutions to the problem of textual interpretation. Instead, he proffers that the hypothetico-deductive method, by formulating hypotheses regarding possible meanings, and testing them empirically, can lead to the derivation of truth. This is a challenging text, one that questions many foundational hermeneutical principles in today’s environ; however, it is a worthwhile read for social scientists and advanced students of higher learning who possess keen interest in hermeneutical topics.
Bradford McCall, Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA