Michael McKenna and Paul Russell, eds. Free Will and Reactive Attitudes (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2008), x + 328 Pps., $124.95
The philosophical debate about free will and responsibility is a perennial issue of great importance for modern philosophy. This debate was largely revived through the publication of P. F. Strawson’s 1962 essay entitled ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Strawson’s essay has generated a wide range of discussion and criticism in the philosophical community since that time and warrantedly so. In fact, Strawson’s essay has even shaped the way contemporary philosophers now approach the problem. McKenna (Associate Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University) and Russell (Professor of Philosophy, University of British Columbia) bring together a selection of the major contributions and reactions to the free will and responsibility debate inspired by Strawson’s publication, some of which will be mentioned in the review that follows.
In the introduction, McKenna and Russell provide a comprehensive overview of the debate. Therein they contend that Strawson’s essay must be viewed from two directions: first, it must be viewed from the classical free will debate as it was understood in the middle of the twentieth century – that is, along the lines of determinism; secondly, it must be seen from the perspective of the critical responses and debates it has generated. The first chapter is a reprinting of Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ text, wherein he suggests that we no longer view free will from the aspects of freedom and responsibility, but from what actually goes on when we hold a person responsible instead. That claim of Strawson forms the discussion parameters of around which the remainder of the chapters of this volume are centered.
A.J. Ayer’s central concern in chapter two is regarding the relevance of the concept of ‘desert’ for the rationality of humanity’s reactive attitudes; he finds that the concept of desert is empty, and hence also is the concept of responsibility that is founded upon it (45). Jonathon Bennett, in his contribution to chapter three, highlights the ‘profound’ contribution of Strawson to moral philosophy, an aspect of Strawson’s influence heretofore underdeveloped. Susan Wolf defends Strawson in the fourth chapter, agreeing with him that even in the absence of free will, humanity would have no reason to give up the practices of reward and punishment, or the reactive attitudes that these actions represent; nevertheless, the concept of free will is important to the meaning of our lives and the realization of our values (69). Galen Strawson, in chapter five, questions whether P.F. Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’ really does undercut the traditional free will debate; in fact, this essay suggests that our deepest commitment to belief in free will is in our experience of our own agency, and not the reactive attitudes toward others (85).
The sixth chapter brings the problem of theodicy to bear upon Strawson’s framework as presented in chapter one; in contrast to Wolf in chapter four, t is suggested that even though people can be veritably culpable of terrible – even monstrous or heinous – crimes, certain occurrences involving them earlier in life may make absolve them of responsibility for the action. Interestingly, Kevin Magill defends Strawson’s notion that belief in free will does not need justification, as well as argues that we do not need to justify holding people accountable for their actions in the ninth chapter. Written by Derek Pereboom, the eleventh chapter develops three points of disagreement with Strawson’s essay, and I view this chapter to be the most valuable of the lot due to its pointed and sustained criticism. Pereboom holds to a unique perspective on free will in that he argues that free will is nullified in the event of either determinism or indeterminism being true; he argues instead that being undetermined agent-causes would be the only way in which one might be held morally responsible for their actions, a viewpoint, however, that deems illogical (219–220).
In sum, all of these essays make a significant contribution to the interpretation and criticism of the strategy taken in Strawson’s ‘Freedom and Resentment’. The editors have done a fine job in bringing together essays that are perhaps not easily accessible to all patrons, as well as offering new essays that are apropos; the suggested readings list at the end of the book is also a nice addition. As such, the book will be of great value to scholars of Strawson and those interested in the free will debate more generally.
Bradford McCall, Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA.