Robert J. Stainton, ed. Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (Contemporary Debates in Philosophy; Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), xiv+ 339 Pps., $42.95; Richard Menary, Cognitive Integration: Mind and Cognition Unbounded (New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), x + 207 Pps., $84.95.
Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary attempt to understand the mind. There are typically four branches of cognitive science recognized: 1) behavioral, 2) social, 3) logic-based, and 4) philosophical. Robert J. Stainton, Associate Professor at the University of Western Ontario, here edits a volume regarding Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science, particularly on how philosophy intersects with cognitive science. With contributions by renowned experts in the field, this volume introduces central issues in cognitive science by means of debates on key questions. They address such topics as the degree of modularity of the mind, the amount of innate knowledge, whether human cognition is bounded, the role of perception in action, the place of external elements in mental states, and the importance of rules and representations for explaining systematicity. A general overview of the volume will now commence.
Regarding the intersection of philosophy and cognitive science, there are numerous essays within this title. For example, Brie Gertler and William Lycan debate the source and nature of consciousness in their contributions. The variety and extent of modular specialization in the mind is debated by Peter Carruthers, Jesse Prinz, and Richard Samuels, respectively, in their contributions; Carruthers argues for modularity, Prinz against it, and Samuels splits the two. Geoffrey Pullum and Barbara Scholz interact with Robert Matthews and James McGilvary about the way(s) in which the human mind developed its ability for language, especially in regards to the question of innate endowment.
Several contributions to this volume are also from a naturalistic perspective, arguing that the proverbial ‘line’ where philosophy stops and empiricism begins is at least blurred and possibly convoluted. For example, debates in this volume which take this approach include Gerd Gigerenzer, who brings empirical research into a debate with David Matheson that suggests the philosophical tradition has misunderstood rationality’s fundamental nature. Coming from the opposite direction, from philosophy to empirical research, Timothy Williamson asserts that knowledge should be as central to scientific discourse about the mind as it is to philosophical epistemology; he argues that knowledge is a fundamental mental state with a different behavioral profile than well-grounded belief, and such cognitive science cannot leave it out. Ray Jackenoff and Georges Rey, for example, differ sharply about the implications on the science of language and mind on whether there exists any fundamental reality independent of the mind. Kirk Ludwig and Chris Viger debate about the nature and function of perception; Ludwig argues that perception gives an accurate representation of reality, whereas Viger argues the opposite.
Richard Menary, the author of the second title, lectures at the University of Wollongong in Australia. He has published in journals such as Philosophical Psychology and Language Sciences, has edited two books, Radical Enactivism (2006) and The Extended Mind (2007). In this title, Menary argues that thinking is bounded by neither the brain nor the ‘skin’ of an organism. Cognitive systems function, rather, through integration of neural and bodily functions with the functions of representational vehicles. This integrationist position offers a fresh contribution to the emerging embodied and embedded approach to the study of mind. The real pay-off from his argument is that it pictures the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspects of cognition as being integrated into a whole. Menary asserts that the manipulation of external vehicles constitutes cognitive processes and that cognition is hybrid: internal and external processes and vehicles complement one another in the completion of cognitive tasks; we cannot separate the two.
Menary’s book is separated into two parts, the first of which outlines cognitivism and internalism, describes externalism, dynamics and the extended mind, and then defends his view of cognitive integration. The second part of the book explores his conception of cognitive integration by formulating – and defending – four theses: 1) the manipulation thesis (i.e. humans manipulate their environment with their bodies); 2) the hybrid mind thesis (i.e. the interaction of brain and culture); 3) the cognitive practice thesis (i.e. the abilities of the mind to manipulate the environment); and 4) the transformation thesis (i.e. the restructuring of tasks by the mind).
The Stainton volume contributes to the cognitive science debate from different perspectives, covering the middle ground as well as the extremes, and provides valuable overview of the field in an easily comprehensible manner. Many of this volume’s 18 previously unpublished papers also provide overviews of recent work by the authors, so it is an excellent addition to the core texts for upper-division undergraduate courses in philosophy and cognitive science; it makes important original contributions to research on a number of ‘hot’ topics in cognitive science. Menary’s foray into the cutting-edge of cognitive studies marks a bold and highly original examination of the internalism/externalism problem in the cognitive science. Taken together, these two volumes display that cognitive science is an exciting, growing, and vibrant exploration.
Bradford McCall, Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA.